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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
William J. Dinkin*
Cullen D. Seltzer**

I. INTRODUCTION
Because a large amount of the docket for the Court of Appeals
of Virginia is comprised of criminal cases, and since the General
Assembly regularly turns its attention to the questions of crime
and punishment, in almost any year there are a great number of
substantial developments in the criminal law. This past year was
no exception. This article surveys developments in criminal law
and procedure in Virginia from July 2000 to July 2001. Although
this article is intended to survey significant developments over
the past year, the reader is cautioned to bear in mind several important caveats.
First, the constraints of publication schedules prohibit a completely comprehensive survey of cases and legislative developments. This article treats those developments that, in the judgment of these authors, represent significant departures from
previously established legal principles. Second, this article does
not purport to survey the development of criminal law in the federal courts even though those courts do have occasion to interpret
state law along with important federal constitutional issues. Although those decisions are often highly persuasive in the Virginia
courts, they fall outside the scope of this article. Third, there is no
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real substitute for reading the law as the lawmakers have written
it.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT'
A. No-Knock Entries for Search Warrants
In Henry v. Commonwealth,2 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed the general principle that police may not serve a warrant at a home without first knocking, announcing their presence,
and giving the occupants a reasonable opportunity to answer the
door.3 In Henry, however, the court created two exceptions to this
rule, holding that if the officers executing a warrant have a reasonable suspicion (1) that knocking and announcing their presence would increase their peril, or (2) that such an entry is necessary to prevent persons within the dwelling from escaping or
destroying evidence, they may make a "no-knock entry."4 The
court relied on the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Richards v. Wisconsin,5 which held that police need only have a
reasonable suspicion that either of the two exceptions are met,
rather than meeting the higher standard of probable cause.6
The Court of Appeals of Virginia had previously ruled in Woody

1. The section headings that refer to one of the first ten amendments to the Federal
Constitution are a shorthand means of describing which component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is at issue. This is necessarily so because the first
ten amendments to the Federal Constitution do not apply to the states; rather, many of
the protections afforded by those amendments have been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which expressly applies to the states. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial by jury in
criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteesa right ofjury trial in all criminal cases which-were they
to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.")(emphasis added). The modern trend in incorporation theory is that of "selective incorporation," whereby rights deemed to be "fundamental" are "incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment and applied to the states to the same extent that [they] appl[y] to the federal
government." JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTrrUION 43 (1997)

(emphasis added).
2. 32 Va. App. 547, 529 S.E.2d 796 (Ct. App. 2000).
3. Id. at 552, 529 S.E.2d at 798-99.
4. Id. at 552-53, 529 S.E.2d at 799.
5.

520 U.S. 385 (1997).

6. Henry, 32 Va. App. at 552-53, 529 S.E.2d at 799 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at
394).
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v. Commonwealth7 that officers seeking to effect a no-knock entry
into a dwelling must have probable cause that an exception to the
prohibition against such entries exists. 8 The Henry court reasoned, however, that because Virginia's constitutional protections
are "coextensive" with those in the United States Constitution,
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Richards is a binding floor and ceiling for Virginia's constitutional protections.9
As a practical matter, the court's ruling leaves open the possibility that a large majority of search warrants may lead to permissible no-knock entries. In state prosecutions, most search
warrants are for drugs, weapons, or related contraband. ° The officers who execute these warrants will often readily adduce sufficient evidence, based on their experience and training, that they
would have increased the risk of lost evidence or their own peril if
they had announced their entry. In Henry, the court held that a
disturbance outside the dwelling to be searched, caused by two
men who had been on the porch of the dwelling, was sufficient to
create a reasonable suspicion that a police announcement of their
entry would have been either dangerous or futile."
In practice, the effect of Henry could be that the exceptions to
the prohibition against no-knock entries will eventually swallow
the rule. 2 Prosecutors would be wise to exploit this opening. By
the same token, defense counsel should be on guard against it
and be prepared to adduce evidence that announced entries are
frequently successful in discovering contraband. Defendants may
also wish to argue that private citizens who experience unannounced entries in their home are more likely to resist the entering officers, perhaps with force.' 3

7. 13 Va. App. 168, 409 S.E.2d 170 (Ct. App. 1991).
. Id. at 170, 409 S.E.2d at 171.
9. Henry, 32 Va. App. at 552-53, 529 S.E.2d at 799.
10. For example, during August 2001, more than fifty percent of all search warrants
issued in the City of Richmond were for drugs and/or weapons. More than eighty percent
of search warrants for residences involved drugs and/or weapons.
11. Henry, 32 Va. App. at 553, 529 S.E.2d at 799.
12. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 67, 354 S.E.2d 79, 87 (Ct. App.
1987) (noting that the presence of drugs gives rise to the inference of danger).
13. The Supreme Court of Virginia explained the purpose of the knock and announce
rule as follows:
The reasons for the requirement of notice of purpose and authority have been
said to be that the law abhors unnecessary breaking or destruction of any
house, because the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the
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B. FourthAmendment Standing
For Fourth Amendment purposes, the relevant inquiry in determining standing is whether a person has an expectation of privacy. 14 Significantly, the privacy expectation, and consequent constitutional protection, attaches to people, not to places or things. 5
Therefore, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in a package he mails to himself using a fictitious name. 6 Sending to oneself a package addressed to a fictitious person actually
"'indicate[s] an expectation that the contents would remain free
from public examination" rather than an abandonment of a
privacy interest in the package. 7
C. What May Be Seized Pursuantto a Search Warrant
Pursuant to a validly issued search warrant, police may seize a
citizen's private journals and writings. In Moyer v. Commonwealth," the Court of Appeals of Virginia ruled that a search
warrant for "'written materials (letters, diaries).., related to
sexual conduct between juveniles and adults'" did not run afoul of
the protections afforded by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the United States Constitution, 9 reasoning that the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Boyd v. United States ° did
not require a contrary result.2 In Boyd, the Court held that an
order to an accused to produce certain documents was unconstitutional.22 Under such circumstances, compelled production was esperson breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist
seeming aggression on his private property.
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 102, 104, 189 S.E.2d 678, 679 (1972). "Thus, implementation of the rule 'discourages violence and volatile confrontations and encourages orderly executions of search warrants.'" Park v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 407, 412, 528
S.E.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 320,
323, 464 S.E.2d 176, 177 (Ct. App. 1995)).
14. See ISRAEL, supra note 1, at 73-74.
15. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
16. See Williams v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 554, 558, 529 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Ct.
App. 2000).
17. Id. at 559, 529 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting United States v. Richards, 638 F.2d 765, 770
(5th Cir. Mar. 1981) (internal quotations omitted)).
18. 33 Va. App. 8, 531 S.E.2d 580 (Ct. App. 2000).
19. Id. at 14, 16, 531 S.E.2d at 583-84.
20. 116 U.S. 616(1886).
21. Moyer, 33 Va. App. at 17-18, 531 S.E.2d at 584-85.
22. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638.
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sentially testimony compelled by the government.23 In contrast,
the search warrant executed by police in Moyer did not contemplate any testimony by the accused in the production of the
documents.'
D. Probable Cause
In Colaw v. Commonwealth,25 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
took the unusual step of invalidating the results of a search incident to the execution of a search warrant.2 6 In doing so, the court
agreed with the trial court's ruling that the affidavit in support of
the subject warrant did not establish probable cause. The deputy sheriff who applied to a magistrate for the warrant stated in
his supporting affidavit that "'on September 12th 1997 a reliable
informant called [him] by phone and noticed [him] of a party at
Steven Wimer's residence that the people there will be using and
selling narcotics."'28 The affidavit further asserted that the confidential informant was someone who had "'displayed knowledge of
drug use and distribution on numerous occasions,"' and whose
previous information had led to two arrests.29
The court of appeals not only concluded that the affidavit failed
to establish probable cause, but the court also held that the warrant was an invalid anticipatory search warrant. ° The court
noted that the affidavit failed to show either the date that criminal activity would occur or a reason why the informant believed
the activity would occur on any particular date.3 '
Most notably, the court concluded that the good-faith exception
set forth in United States v. Leon3 2 did not apply in this situa23. See id. at 634.
24. Moyer, 33 Va. App. at 6, 531 S.E.2d at 584. "As a result, appellant's diaries, which
were prepared voluntarily, are not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination unless appellant was compelled to produce them, and then, only the act
of production and not the contents of the diaries would be protected." Moyer, 33 Va. App.
at 21, 531 S.E.2d at 586.
25. 32 Va. App. 806, 531 S.E.2d 31 (Ct. App. 2000).
26. Id. at 814, 531 S.E.2d at 34-35.
27. Id. at 811, 531 S.E.2d at 33.
28. Id. at 809, 531 S.E.2d at 32.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 812, 531 S.E.2d at 33.
31. Id.
32. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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tion.3 3 Ordinarily, pursuant to Leon, the government may rely

upon evidence obtained during the course of a search warrant
even if the warrant should not have been issued because it was
not supported by probable cause.3 4 The Leon exception to the warrant requirement presupposes, however, that the officer acted in
good faith."
Under the circumstances in Colaw, the court reasoned that the
officer did not act in good faith because "'the warrant was based
on an affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable."'36 The affidavit's defects included the failure to specify a date or time where criminal
activity would take place and the fact that the informant did not
report having been in the place to be searched or having seen
anyone purchase, sell, use, or possess drugs there.37 The court
concluded that "[o]nly by blindly accepting the informant's conclusory statement could one believe the drugs would be at the
residence."' That sort of bare-bones affidavit removed the warrant from the ambit of the Leon good-faith exception.39
E. ReasonableArticulable Suspicion
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed that police may
order a passenger of a vehicle to exit the vehicle when it is
stopped because the driver is suspected of some offense.4" In
Hamlin v. Commonwealth,4 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held
that police could permissibly conduct a very brief, seconds-long
detention of a passenger in a stopped vehicle to "investigate the
circumstances surrounding the presence of an open container of
an alcoholic beverage in the car."42 In concluding that the deten-

33. Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 812, 531 S.E.2d at 34.
34. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
35. Id.
36. Colaw, 32 Va. App. at 812, 531 S.E.2d at 34 (quoting Atkins v. Commonwealth, 9
Va. App. 462, 464, 389 S.E.2d 179, 180 (Ct. App. 1990)).
37. Id. at 812, 531 S.E.2d at 33-34.
38. Id. at 814, 531 S.E.2d at 34.
39. Id.
40. See Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997).
41. 33 Va. App. 494, 534 S.E.2d 363 (Ct. App. 2000).
42. Id. at 501, 534 S.E.2d at 366.
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tion was reasonable, the court emphasized the very limited nature of the detention.'
The dissent in Hamlin reasoned that the officer's explanation
for detaining the defendant-the one apparently endorsed by the
majority--effectively placed the defendant "under investigative
detention for the open alcoholic beverage container in the vehicle," and was itself impermissible.' The dissent noted that "[n]o
city ordinance or state law bars a passenger in a vehicle from
having an alcoholic beverage in an open container."4 5 Moreover,
according to the dissent, the "Commonwealth concedes this point
but argues that '[alt most, the officer may have made a mistake of
law and did not act in bad faith."4 6 The dissent concluded:
"[ilf officers are allowed to stop [individuals] based upon their subjective belief that ...laws have been violated even where no such violation has, in fact, occurred [nor could it have occurred since no law
proscribed the activity], the potential for abuse of... infractions as
pretext for effecting [detentions]
seems boundless and the costs to
"47
privacy rights excessive.

Nevertheless, the fact that government agents may be mistaken about the facts of an encounter, and still permissibly detain
suspects, is apodictic. Terry stops predicated on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, and routine arrests predicated on mere
probable cause, contemplate, by definition, that the probative
value of the evidence compiled by police may not be enough to
prove the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.4 8 Indeed, an
officer may ultimately be proven mistaken about the facts that
led her to reasonably suspect criminal activity or have probable
cause to believe a defendant was engaged in crime.49

43. See id. at 502, 534 S.E.2d at 366.
44. Id. at 504-05, 534 S.E.2d at 368 (Benton, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 505, 534 S.E.2d at 368 (Benton, J., dissenting).
46. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282,
289 (5th Cir. 1999)).
48. See id. (Benton, J., dissenting); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 35-37 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).

49. See Hamlin, 33 Va. App. at 505, 534 S.E.2d at 368 (Benton, J., dissenting); see also
Terry, 392 U.S. at 36 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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F.Roadblocks
In Trent v. Commonwealth," the Court of Appeals of Virginia
applied the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond.5 In Edmond, the Court held that a
checkpoint program, such as a roadblock, contravenes the Fourth
Amendment when its primary purpose is the interdiction of illegal narcotics. 2 The Supreme Court stated:
We decline to suspend the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where the police seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the
ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. We cannot sanction stops
justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has
committed some crime.
...While we do not limit these purposes that may justify a
checkpoint program to any rigid set of categories, we decline to approve a program whose primary purpose is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.53

In Trent, the court noted that even though the officers were
told in a pre-checkpoint briefing to ask each driver for his license,
they were also instructed to target drug violations. 4 Furthermore, the officer in charge of the roadblock testified that asking
for a driver's license was merely a tactic used to engage the driver
in conversation concerning drug activity.55 Relying on Edmond,
the court held that the roadblock was per se unconstitutional and,
therefore, reversed and dismissed the appellant's conviction.56
G. Seizure
A person is seized by police within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment only when "by means of physical force or a show of
authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."57 Under this

50. 35 Va. App. 248, 544 S.E.2d 379 (Ct. App. 2001).
51.
52.
53.

531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 40-42.
Id. at 44.

54.

35 Va. App. at 251, 544 S.E.2d at 381.

55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
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standard, the Court of Appeals of Virginia deemed unconstitu8 In Carttional the seizure in Cartwright v. Commonwealth."
wright, a uniformed police officer entered a convenience store
that he frequently visited and "'said put your hands up' in a
'friendly and joking manner."'59 In response, the appellant and
other customers raised their hands in the air.6" The officer testified that his hands were in his pockets when he made the statement and that none of the officers present displayed a weapon.6 '
The officer later approached the appellant and began a conversation, during the course of which he asked the appellant for his
driver's license.62 Two other uniformed officers stood approximately three feet behind the appellant. 63 The appellant consented
to a search and pulled a baggie containing a large off-white rocklike substance from his pocket. 64 The appellant was subsequently
handcuffed and arrested for possession of cocaine.65 At trial, the
appellant moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing that his consent
to the search was not voluntary because he was subjected to an
illegal seizure.66
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the cocaine found on
the appellant was the fruit of an illegal seizure. 67 The court reasoned that the fact that a uniformed police officer, in the presence
of two other uniformed officers, retained possession of the appellant's identification was sufficient to indicate that a seizure had

occurred.6'Furthermore, the court noted that when the appellant
raised his hands in response to the officer's apparent command to
"put your hands up," he was clearly attempting to comply with a
police order, and this compliance signified his belief that he was
not free to leave.69

58. No. 1349-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 254 (Ct. App. May 15, 2001) (unpublished
decision).

59. Id. at *2.
60. Id. at*3.
61. Id. at *2-3.
62.
63.

Id. at *3-5.
Id. at*3.

64. Id.
65. Id. at "4.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *11.
68. Id. at*10.
69. Id.

546

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:537

III. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Self-Incrimination
In Commonwealth v. Hill,7 the use of polygraph testing as a
special condition of probation was held not to violate a probationer's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 7' The
appellant argued that such requisite testing violated his Fifth
Amendment rights because it presented "a 'Hobson's choice' of either (1) making statements that could potentially be used against
him at a revocation hearing or in a new criminal proceeding, or
(2) having his probation revoked for failing to cooperate with the
directives of his probation officer."72 The Commonwealth responded by arguing that the appellant "had no Fifth Amendment
rights in the context of probationary supervision, as his privilege
against self-incrimination [abated] ...the moment his sentence

was fixed by the court."73
Although the court rejected the arguments from both sides, it
upheld the use of polygraph testing as a condition of probation.74
The court set forth several policy reasons for its holding, including: (1) probationers maintain conditional liberty, unlike the absolute liberty of ordinary citizens; (2) the supervision of probationers is a special need of the state, which permits a degree of
impingement upon privacy that would otherwise be unconstitutional; and (3) probation officers would be rendered virtually
powerless if the privilege of self-incrimination applied to the
questioning of probationers concerning conditions of their probation.75
B. Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

No. 85436, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 66 (Cir. Ct. Apr. 10, 2001) (Fairfax County).
Id. at *42.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *16-18.
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put in jeopardy of life or limb."76 The guarantee affords an accused three distinct constitutional rights: it disallows (1) a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple
punishments for the same offense. 7
In Herbin v. Commonwealth,"8 the appellant, who had been
convicted of robbery and abduction, argued that the trial court
erred in finding that there was an abduction of two individuals
"separate and apart from the detention inherent in the robbery."79
During the course of a robbery, the appellant took two employees
into a back room and ordered them not to come out until they
were sure the appellant was gone."0
In asserting his double jeopardy claim, the appellant relied
upon the language of Brown v. Commonwealth,1 which stated
that
"[olne accused of abduction by detention and another crime involving
restraint of the victim, both growing out of a continuing course of
conduct, is subject upon conviction to separate penalties for separate
offenses only when the detention committed in the act of abduction is
separate and apart from, and not merely incidental to, the restraint
employed in the commission of the other crime."82

Based on this theory, the appellant argued that a defendant
may be convicted of abduction in addition to robbery only if the
victim's detention is .separate and apart from, and not merely
incidental to, the restraint employed in the commission of [robbery].""3 The court rejected these arguments, instead holding that
the trial court, as the trier of fact, could have reasonably concluded that the abductions were separate and apart from the restraint employed in the commission of the robbery.' Specifically,

76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969).
78. No. 0223-00-3, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 40 (Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001) (unpublished decision).
79. Id. at *1.
80. Id. at *2-3.
81. 230 Va. 310, 337 S.E.2d 711 (1985).
82. Herbin,2001 Va. App. LEXIS 40, at *4(quoting Brown, 230 Va. at 314, 337 S.E.2d
at 713-14).
83. Id. at 5 (quoting Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 311, 377 S.E.2d 595, 600
(1989)).

84. Id. at*8.
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the court found the appellant's instructions to the employees to
remain in the room were made with the intent to extort pecuniary
benefit and to facilitate his escape.85
In Coleman v. Commonwealth,8 6 the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to decide whether the appellant's convictions for the
malicious wounding and attempted murder of the same victim
subjected the defendant to double jeopardy." Both the circuit
court and the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that shooting the victim six times in the arms and legs was separate and
distinct from the act, ten seconds later, of walking over to the victim's body and shooting the victim in the head.'8
The appellant asserted two arguments in his defense.89 First,
he argued that "the evidence established that his conduct constituted one continuous act."9" Second, he contended that "the crime
of attempted murder is a lesser included offense of malicious
wounding, and therefore, he is entitled to the benefit of the double jeopardy provisions contained in the Fifth Amendment."9 1 The
appellant relied on the test set forth in Blockburger v. United
States92 to support these arguments.9 3 The Blockburger test determines "'whether each [offense charged] requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."'94 When applying this
test, courts are required to look at the "offenses charged in the
abstract, without referring to the particular facts of the case under review."95
Furthermore, the appellant relied on language in Brown v.
Commonwealth,9 6 asserting that "'attempted murder and mali97
cious wounding convictions cannot arise from one transaction.'

85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
261 Va. 196, 539 S.E.2d 732 (2001).
Id. at 198, 539 S.E.2d at 733.
Id. at 199, 539 S.E.2d at 733.

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
93. Coleman, 261 Va. at 200, 539 S.E.2d at 734.
94. Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304).
95. Id. (citing Blythe v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 726-27, 284 S.E.2d 796, 798-99
(1981)).
96. 222 Va. 111, 279 S.E.2d 142 (1981).
97. Coleman, 261 Va. at 201, 539 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting Brown, 222 Va. at 116, 279
S.E.2d at 146).
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In Brown, the jury convicted the defendant of assault and battery
under an indictment charging attempted murder, and additionally convicted the defendant of unlawful wounding under an indictment for malicious wounding." Thus, in Brown, the defendant's conviction for unlawful wounding barred his further
conviction "of all other offenses of a higher grade and of any lesser
included offense encompassed by the malicious wounding indictment."9 The court in Coleman declined to apply this rationale so
broadly.0 0
C. Miranda
In Redmond v. Commonwealth,'' the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a conviction due to the failure of the trial judge to
suppress a statement obtained after the appellant expressed his
desire to have counsel present.'1 2 In this case, the appellant specifically requested, "Can I speak to my lawyer? I can't even talk to
[a] lawyer before I make any kinds of comments or anything?"" 3
The police officer responded that this was the appellant's only opportunity to give his side of the story.' 4 This misstatement ultimately resulted in a confession. °5 Holding that the appellant's
request was a textbook example of the invocation of one's
Miranda rights, the court overturned the conviction."' The court
stated, "Redmond's statement... [was] an unambiguous request
to talk to his counsel and was directly responsive to the detective's earlier
warning that 'You have the right to talk to a law07
yer."1
The Redmond holding can be contrasted with the ruling of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia in Hopkins v. Commonwealth.0' In

98. Brown, 222 Va. at 113, 279 S.E.2d at 143.
99. Id. at 116, 279 S.E.2d at 146.
100. Coleman, 261 Va. at 202, 539 S.E.2d at 735.
101. No. 0762-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 276 (Ct. App. May 22, 2001) (unpublished
decision).
102. Id. at *1.
103. Id. at *5.

104
105.
106.
107.
108.
cision).

Id.
Id.
Id. at*9
Id. at *8.
No. 0502-00-1, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 244 (Ct. App. May 8, 2001) (unpublished de-
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Hopkins, the court found that a custodial interrogation did not exist when police questioned a juvenile and ultimately obtained a
confession to murder in the first degree and conspiracy to commit
murder. °9 The appellant agreed to accompany the police to headquarters, and the police obtained the consent of the appellant's
mother to take the appellant for questioning." ° The appellant
was instructed several times that he did not have to talk to the
police and that he was free to leave."' Throughout the interview,
the appellant was allowed to use the restroom unescorted, was offered food and drink, and voluntarily took the police to the burial
site of the victim." 2 Furthermore, it was uncontroverted that the
appellant was not a suspect and that the appellant's confession
was unexpected until the close of the interview."' In its ruling,
the court identified the following factors as pertinent to the resolution of a custody issue in the Miranda context: "(1) the familiarity or neutrality of the surroundings, (2) the number of police
officers present, (3) the degree of physical restraint, (4) the duration and character of the interrogation, (5) the presence of probable cause to arrest, and (6) 4whether the suspect has become the
focus of the investigation.'1

IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT

The Sixth Amendment embodies a criminal defendant's right to
counsel. In Tasco v. Commonwealth,"' the trial court declined to
appoint new counsel for the appellant when his attorney testified
on his behalf."6 The Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility" 7 provides that an attorney need not withdraw as counsel

when testifying on behalf of a client if: (1) the testimony relates to
a substantially uncontested matter; (2) the testimony pertains to

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

*1-2.
*3.
*4-5.
*6.
*7-8.

114. Id. at *8-9 (quoting Bosworth v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 567, 572, 375 S.E.2d
756, 759 (Ct. App. 1989)).
115. No. 2946-99-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 8 (Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2001) (unpublished decision).
116. Id. at *1.
117. The court used the Code of Professional Responsibility rather than the Rules of
Professional Conduct because they were the Rules in effect at the time of the trial.
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the value of legal services provided; or (3) withdrawal would constitute an undue hardship on the client."' In ruling against the
appellant, the Court of Appeals of Virginia concluded that he had
failed to demonstrate that defense counsel's decision to testify on
his behalf created an actual conflict of interest between the appellant and his attorneys. 9
V. DUE PROCESS
Last year, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided for the first
time that juveniles have neither a due process right nor a statutory right to assert an insanity defense in the adjudicatory phase
of juvenile delinquency proceedings 2 ° In Commonwealth v. Chatman, the court found that: (1) the United States Constitution
does not require states to recognize an insanity defense for adult
defendants; (2) even if the United States Constitution did recognize such a right, that right would not apply to juvenile defendants; and (3) an insanity defense is not fundamental to the factfinding process because sanity, unlike mens rea, is not an element of this particular offense. 2 '
In Chatman, the defendant, a thirteen-year-old juvenile, was
charged with delinquency; the petition alleged that he had committed the crime of malicious wounding in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-51.122 Upon appeal from the Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court to the Greensville Circuit Court,
the defendant moved for a psychiatric evaluation to determine
whether he was insane at the time of the offense. 23 The defendant claimed that he had a long, documented history of mental
illness, that on the day of the offense a medical doctor examined
him and determined that he displayed "homicidal ideations," and
that a licensed clinical psychologist diagnosed him with "Schizophreniform Disorder" two days after the offense.' 24

118.
sibility
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Tasco, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 8, at *5 (citing Virginia Code of Professional ResponDR:5-101(B)(1) through (3)).
Id. at 8.
See Commonwealth v. Chatman, 260 Va. 562, 574, 538 S.E.2d 304, 309 (2000).
Id. at 567, 538 S.E.2d at 306.
Id. at 565, 538 S.E.2d at 305.
Id.
Id.
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The Commonwealth did not contest either the alleged mental
problems or the existence of an adult's right, under Virginia law,
to a psychiatric evaluation for these conditions.12' Based solely on
the defendant's status as a juvenile, however, the court held that
the defendant had neither a due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution nor a statutory right
under Virginia law to assert such an insanity de12 6
fense.
In Salmon v. Commonwealth,2 7 another case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the Due Process
Clause is not violated by the Commonwealth's investigation into
the criminal backgrounds of potential jurors. 28 The court upheld
Virginia Code section 19.2-389(A)(1), which provides in pertinent
part:
Criminal history record information shall be disseminated.., only
to: Authorized officers or employees of criminal justice agencies...
for purposes of the administration of criminal justice and the screening of an employment application or review of employment by a
criminal justice agency with respect to its own employees or applicants, and dissemination to the Virginia Parole Board.' 29

This statute specifically refers to the definitions of key terms in
Virginia Code section 9-169, such as "criminal justice agencies"
and "administration of criminal justice." 3 ° The court held that
"[because the administration of criminal justice, by definition,
includes the 'prosecution... of accused persons or criminal offenders,' the Office of the Commonwealth's Attorney constitutes a
'criminal justice agency' within the meaning of Code § 9-169.""l 1
In Thomas v. Commonwealth,3 2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that a defendant's constitutional right to waive assistance of
counsel takes precedence over a trial court's judgment that coun-

125. Id.
126. Id. at 572, 538 S.E.2d at 309.
127. 32 Va. App. 586, 529 S.E.2d 815 (Ct. App. 2000).
128. Id. at 594, 529 S.E.2d at 819.
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-389(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
130. Id. "Administration of criminal justice" is defined as the "performance of any activity directly involving the... prosecution.., of accused persons or criminal offenders." Id.
§ 9.1-101 (Cum.Supp. 2001).
131. Salmon, 32 Va. App. at 593, 529 S.E.2d at 818.
132. 260 Va. 553, 539 S.E.2d 79 (2000).
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sel is necessary due to the nature of the offense charged. 3 The
court held that the right to counsel is properly waived when a defendant knowingly and intelligently makes such a decision.'3 4 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta v.
California,3 ' the court noted that the right to assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment also provides an inverse
right to self-representation.' 36
In Thomas, the dispositive issue was whether the defendant
made a motion to represent himself in a timely fashion. 3 v The
court stated that "[wihen the motion is timely, the trial court has
no discretion to deny a defendant his right to represent himself, if
the trial court is satisfied that the requirements of Farettahave
been met." 3 ' Finding that the defendant had made his motion in
a timely manner, the court concluded that "[w]hatever legitimate
misgivings the trial court may have had about the difficulty Thomas would face in representing himself, his constitutional right to
waive the assistance of counsel takes precedence when the choice
to exercise that right is knowingly and intelligently made."'39
In Williams v. Commonwealth,4 0 the appellant requested a
jury after having signed a jury waiver two months prior to trial.'
Counsel for the appellant articulated surprise at this request and
communicated to the court that he was not prepared for a jury
trial.' The trial court found that the defendant had waived his
right to trial by jury. 4 3
The Court of Appeals of Virginia began its analysis by noting
that "'[wihere there has been a knowing, intentional and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial, there is no absolute constitutional right to withdraw it.'"" However, the court concluded

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
14L
142.
143.
144.
398-99,

See id. at 560-61, 539 S.E.2d at 83.
Id.
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
Thomas, 260 Va.at 559, 539 S.E.2d at 82.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1324 (4th Cir. 1979)).
Id. at 561, 539 S.E.2d at 83.
33 Va. App. 506, 534 S.E.2d 369 (Ct. App. 2000).
Id. at 512, 534 S.E.2d at 371.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 513, 534 S.E.2d at 372 (quoting Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392,
345 S.E.2d 5, 9 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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that in the instant case, the record did not reflect that the appellant waived his right voluntarily and intelligently, but rather
that the appellant signed the waiver, and the Commonwealth's
Attorney and the trial court concurred. 45 In finding for the appellant, the court relied on the rationale in Jones v. Commonwealth,'46 where the Supreme Court of Virginia found that in the
absence of proof that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily, such a waiver is void, and the appellant must be afforded the
right to trial by jury under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.'47
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed a novel issue
in the case of Burns v. Commonwealth,'48 where the appellant
was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing
his mother-in-law during the commission of a rape and forcible
sodomy.149 The appellant contended on appeal that the trial court
should have allowed him to examine law enforcement officials
under oath to determine whether all potential exculpatory evidence had been disclosed to the Commonwealth's Attorney. 5 ° The
Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this contention, holding that
there was no authority for such a proposition; rather, it was the
duty of the individual prosecutor to discover and disclose all exculpatory information to the defendant. 5 '
VI. CAPITAL MURDER

Virginia courts have recently considered two appeals involving
the interpretation of Virginia Code section 18.2-31(8), which
states that "[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of
more than one person within a three-year period" is capital murder.

152

In Burlile v. Commonwealth,53 the appellant contended that,

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 514, 534 S.E.2d at 372.
24 Va. App. 636, 484 S.E.2d 618 (Ct. App. 1997).
Id. at 639-40, 484 S.E.2d at 619-20.
261 Va. 307, 541 S.E.2d 872 (2001).
Id. at 313, 541 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 328, 541 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(8) (Repl. Vol. 1997).
261 Va. 501, 544 S.E.2d. 360 (2001).
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pursuant to this provision, the Commonwealth must prove that
the defendant was a principal in the first degree, or "triggerman,"
in each homicide.'5 4 In rejecting this contention, the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that this subsection of capital murder is a
"gradation crime."' As such, the Commonwealth need only prove
that the defendant is the "triggerman" in the principal murder
charged.5 6 Thus, for the killing of more than one person in a
three-year period, the defendant may be an accomplice or principal in the second degree in the underlying murder used to elevate
the grade of the primary crime to capital murder. 7
In Smith v. Commonwealth,5 ' the appellant was tried in a single proceeding for four individual murders.'5 9 The first two murders were alleged to be part of the same act, and the defendant
was charged with capital murder under Virginia Code section
18.2-31(7).16 ° The Commonwealth relied upon the third murder to
support the charge of capital murder of the fourth alleged victim
by charging Smith with the killing of more than one person
within a three-year period pursuant to Virginia Code section
18.2-31(8).161 The trial court refused to sever the four murder
counts pursuant to a motion under Rule 3A:10(c) of the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia. 62 The Court of Appeals of Vir-

154. Id. at 505, 544 S.E.2d at 362.
155. Id. at 511, 544 S.E.2d at 365-66. The court noted that there are several types of
murder that the legislature has elevated to capital murder: those that are concerned with
the status of the victim (e.g., the murder of a law enforcement officer in violation of VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(6) (Cum. Supp. 2001)); those that are concerned with the status of
the defendant (e.g., murder by a prisoner confined in a state or local correctional facility in
violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(3) (Cum.Supp. 2001)); and "gradation" offenses,
which elevate a single act of premeditated murder to capital murder because it is qualitatively more egregious (e.g., murder during the commission of abduction with intent to defile in violation of VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(1) (Cum. Supp. 2001)). Id. at 509-10, 544
S.E.2d at 364-65.
156. Id. at 511, 544 S.E.2d at 365.
157. See id. at 510-11, 544 S.E.2d at 365.
158. 35 Va. App. 68, 542 S.E.2d 803 (Ct. App. 2001).
159. Id. at 71, 542 S.E.2d at 804.
160. Id. at 71-72, 542 S.E.2d at 804.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 71, 542 S.E.2d at 804. In the absence of consent by both parties, Rule
3A.10(c) permits the court to join separate charges for trial if two criteria are met:
(1) justice does not require separate trials; and (2) either (a) the requirements
of Rule 3A.6(b) are met; or (b) the defendant and the Commonwealth's attorney consent. Under Rule 3A.6(b), the offenses must be either: (1) part of the
same act or transaction; or (2) two or more acts or transactions which are
connected; or (3)the offenses must be part of a common plan or scheme.
VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:10(c).
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ginia found no support in the record for the proposition that the
murders were in any way connected as part of a common scheme
or plan and concluded that the trial
court abused its discretion in
163
allowing them to be tried together.
While not directly addressed in Smith, this ruling appears to
dispel the notion, often asserted by prosecutors,'" that the underlying or "predicate" murder relied upon to upgrade a subsequent
murder to capital murder under Virginia Code section 18.2-31(8)
can be treated merely as one of the elements of the capital charge.
Unless the offenses can otherwise be joined under the provisions
of Rules 3A:6 and 3A:10(c), prosecutors must either have in hand
a prior conviction for a murder committed within a three-year period, or they must try the murders separately, seeking the "gradation crime" of capital murder only after securing a prior conviction for murder.'6 5
The Supreme Court of Virginia has also considered a number of
penalty phase issues arising in capital murder cases. In Powell v.
Commonwealth,'66 the court examined Virginia Code section 19.2264.4(D), the statutory verdict form for the sentencing phase of a
capital murder case,' 6 7 and Virginia Code section 18.2-10, the
statute providing the punishment for capital murder. 6 8 The
69
Court found that a conflict does exist between the two sections.
In harmonizing these provisions, however, the court held that
"the jury must receive a verdict form that, in addition to addressing the imposition of a sentence of death and the imposition of a
sentence of life imprisonment, also allows the jury to impose a
sentence of life and a fine of up to $100,00o0.)17

163. Smith, 35 Va. App. at 75, 542 S.E.2d at 806. Smith was convicted by the jury of
only one count of first-degree murder and the related firearm charge, and he was sentenced to a total of sixty years incarceration. Id. at 71-72, 542 S.E.2d at 804. The case was
reversed and remanded to the trial court. Id. at 78, 542 S.E.2d at 807.
164. Indeed, one of the authors herein has made this assertion.
165. See Smith, 35 Va. App. at 75, 542 S.E.2d at 806.
166. 261 Va. 512, 544 S.E.2d 679 (2001).
167. The statutory verdict form under this provision does not contain a reference to an
alternative sentence of life imprisonment or a reference to the maximum fine to be imposed. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19-2.264.4(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
168. Powell, 261 Va. at 542-44, 544 S.E.2d at 697-98. This section includes an alternative sentence of life and a fine of not more than $100,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a)
(Cum. Supp. 2001).
169. Powell, 261 Va. at 543-44, 544 S.E.2d at 697-98.
170. Id. at 544, 544 S.E.2d at 698.

20011

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

More importantly, however, the Powell court considered the issue of whether the current statutory verdict form set forth in Virginia Code section 19.2-264.4(D) is likely to confuse a jury since
the provision appears to allow the death sentence only if one or
both aggravating factors are proven beyond a reasonable doubt.17 1
The court found that the potential for confusion did exist, holding
that:
in a capital murder trial, the trial court must give the jury verdict
forms providing expressly for the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $100,000 when the jury
finds that one or both of the
172 aggravating factors have been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.

In Lenz v. Commonwealth,7 3 the court addressed a capital
murder conviction for the killing of an inmate by another inmate. 74 In his appeal, Lenz contended that the trial court erred
in precluding introduction of the victim's criminal history during
the sentencing phase of the trial,' 75 asserting that such information should be received by the jury to consider in mitigation of the
offense. 7 6 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, ruling that
Lenz had no constitutional right to present the victim's criminal
history and that such evidence was irrelevant to the consideration of whether the defendant's acts were vile or inhuman,
showed depravity of mind, or whether
the defendant would con7
stitute a continuing threat to society.'
In Lovitt v. Commonwealth,"8 the appellant argued that the
trial court erred in refusing to allow him to argue to the jury that
"he would die in prison" if given a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.'7 9 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that such an argument is speculative in nature
and incorrect as a matter of law.8 0 The court reasoned that "prisoners who have received a sentence of life imprisonment without

171. Id. at 545, 544 S.E.2d at 698.
172. Id. at 545, 544 S.E.2d at 698-99.
173.
174.
175.
176.

261 Va. 451, 544 S.E.2d 299 (2001).
Id. at 455, 544 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 458, 544 S.E.2d at 303.
Id. at 464, 544 S.E.2d at 307.

177. Id.
178. 260 Va. at 497, 537 S.E.2d at 866 (2000).

179. Id. at 515, 537 S.E.2d at 878.
180. Id.
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possibility of parole are not precluded from receiving executive
clemency for crimes they have committed."1"' The court also rejected the appellant's argument that the jury should consider his
future dangerousness solely in the context of prison "society."'82
The court noted that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.2' contains
no such restrictions on the jury's consideration and, accordingly,
refused to rewrite the statute to restrict its scope. 8 4
VII. TRIAL
A. Jurors
In Barrett v. Commonwealth,'8 5 the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a venireman need not be excluded from a jury simply because he was the brother of a police officer, despite the fact
that the prospective juror's brother was a witness in the pending
case, and that the defendant was charged with assaulting a police
officer." 6 Sitting en banc, the majority of the court of appeals reasoned that per se rules of juror disqualification are few in number
and viewed with disfavor in Virginia." 7 The majority further
concluded that the prospective juror's repeated assertion that he
could be impartial in the matter outweighed his lone statement
that "truthfully" he would view his brother's testimony as more
credible than that of the defendant's. 8 8 Finally, the majority
relied on the fact that the testimony of the prospective juror's
brother was not material, the brother was not cross-examined,
and the juror's brother was not the victim in the case. 8 9

181. Id. (citations omitted).
182. Id. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 879.

183. The statute allows a jury to sentence a defendant found guilty of capital murder to
death if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that he "would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society." VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum.Supp. 2001).
184. Lovitt, 260 Va. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 879.
185. 34 Va. App. 374, 542 S.E.2d 23 (Ct. App. 2001) (en banc).
186. Id. at 376, 542 S.E.2d at 24.
187. Id. at 378, 542 S.E.2d at 25.
188. Id. at 380-81, 542 S.E.2d at 26.
189. Id. at 381, 542 S.E.2d at 26. In contrast, last year the Supreme Court of Virginia
held in Medici v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 223, 532 S.E.2d 28 (2000), that "[plublic confidence in the integrity of the" judicial system, and the integrity of criminal trials in particular, was reason enough to strike a venireman for cause and was reversible error not to
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B. ProofBeyond a ReasonableDoubt
In Tarpley v. Commonwealth,9 ' the Supreme Court of Virginia
decided the question of what inferences a fact-finder may draw
from circumstantial evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 9 ' In Tarpley, the evidence proved that the accused (1) was
involved in a fight with the victim; (2) drove the victim's car away
from the scene of the fight after the victim was beaten unconscious; (3) possessed the victim's car for a short while before
abandoning it after a wreck; and (4) was lying when he testified
that he took the car to get help for the victim.'92 The court held
that those facts, collectively and individually, provided an insufficient basis to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
had the intent to permanently deprive the victim of his car. 9 3 The
court instead concluded that such an inference was purely speculative. 9 4 In so holding, the court explicitly stated that disbelief of
the accused's account "does not provide a factual basis for establishing "the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'95 The
court's reversal of this conviction makes clear that although a
fact-finder has broad discretion to find facts as it sees fit, the appellate courts may and should closely scrutinize the inferences
that are drawn from those facts.
C. Speedy Trial
In Heath v. Commonwealth,'96 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the appellant's request for a psychiatric evaluation
tolled the statutory speedy trial period for the time he remained
in custody awaiting trial after his preliminary hearing.'97 Although the appellant requested the psychiatric evaluation, he argued that "his request for a psychiatric examination did not condo so. Id.

at 227, 532 S.E.2d at 30-31. In Medici, the defense attorney worked for the same
Public Defender's office as the attorney representing the man accused of murdering a juror's husband. Id. at 227, 532 S.E.2d at 31.
190. 261 Va. 251, 542 S.E.2d 761 (2001).
191. Id. at 252, 542 S.E.2d at 761.
192. Id. at 254-55, 542 S.E.2d at 762-63.
193. Id. at 257, 542 S.E.2d at 764.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. 261 Va. 389, 541 S.E.2d 906 (2001).
197. Id. at 393, 541 S.E.2d at 908.
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tain a request for a continuance" and, therefore, the statutory
speedy trial period was not tolled. 9 ' The court rejected his argument, initially noting that the speedy trial protections granted in
Virginia Code section 19.2-243 may be waived.' 99 The court reasoned that because the appellant's motion for a psychiatric examination included a request to determine his competency to
stand trial, the motion implicitly requested that the court continue the case so that the examination could be performed.2 °0
Thus, the court found that the appellant's motion triggered the
statutory tolling provisions of Virginia Code section 19.2-243(4).o1
The Isle of Wight Circuit Court issued a related ruling in Commonwealth v. Norton,2 2 holding that there is no exception to the
statutory five-month period for the commencement of a trial in
cases where one prosecutor cannot produce an accused for trial
because another prosecutor in a neighboring jurisdiction has the
defendant before a different court on the same day.20 3 In so holding, the court determined that the enumerated exception for witnesses who are being "enticed or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or accident" does not encompass this type of
situation.2 4
In Norton, the Commonwealth argued that the appellant's unavailability on his trial date should not be attributable to the
Commonwealth, even though the defendant was in a neighboring
jurisdiction on that date facing different charges that were also
issued by the Commonwealth.20 5 Based on the principles enunciated in Knott v. Commonwealth,0 6 the court rejected this argument.20 7 The Norton court pointed out that, in Knott, "[tihe Virginia Supreme Court observed that the judicial power to retrieve
an inmate from a penal institution for trial, at the request of the
Commonwealth, reaches "'into every penal institution within the

198. Id. at 392, 541 S.E.2d at 908.
199. Id. (citing Stephens v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 224, 233-34, 301 S.E.2d 22, 27-28
(1983); Brooks v. Peyton, 210 Va. 318, 321, 171 S.E.2d 243, 246 (1969)).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 392, 541 S.E.2d at 908-09.
202. No. CROO-338, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23 (Cir. Ct. Mar 13, 2001) (Isle of Wight
County).
203. Id. at *17.
204. Id. at *14 n.5 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-243 (Repl. Vol. 2000)).
205. Id. at*16.
206. 215 Va. 531, 211 S.E.2d 86 (1975).
207. Norton, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 23, at *17.
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jurisdiction of the sovereign."'2 ° Accordingly, the court concluded

fails to accomplish this task, it
that "[wlhen the Commonwealth
2 °9
has no one to blame but itself."

VIII. CRIMES AND NEW LEGISLATION
A. Post-ConvictionTreatment of BiologicalEvidence
In the wake of recent high-profile cases where DNA evidence
was relied upon to exonerate convicted felons, including death
row inmates, the General Assembly recently established broad
new procedures for the storage, preservation, and retention of
human biological evidence in felony cases.210 The new legislation
allows a convicted felon or his attorney to petition the trial court
to preserve human biological evidence for fifteen years or
longer.2 1' Upon the granting of such a petition, the evidence is
transferred to the custody of the Division of Forensic Science for
preservation.2 12
Another newly enacted provision allows a convicted felon to petition the circuit court that entered his conviction to apply for a
new scientific investigation of human biological evidence.2" 3 The
court must find the following elements before ordering the testing:
(i) the evidence was not known or available at the time the conviction
became final in the circuit court or the evidence was not previously
subjected to testing because the testing procedure was not available
at the Division of Forensic Science at the time the conviction became
final in the circuit court; (ii) the evidence is subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that the evidence has not been altered,
tampered with, or substituted in any way; (iii) the testing is materially relevant, noncumulative, and necessary and may prove the convicted person's actual innocence; (iv) the testing requested involves a
scientific method employed by the Division of Forensic Science; and

208. Id. (quoting Knott, 215 Va. at 533, 211 S.E.2d at 87) (citations omitted).

209. Id.
210.
211.
212.
213.

VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).

Id.
Id.
Id. § 19.2-327.1 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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(v) the convicted person has not unreasonably delayed the filing of
the petition after the evidence or the test for
the evidence became
2 14
available at the Division of Forensic Science.

The petition must also set forth the reasons that the evidence
was not known or tested by the time the conviction became final
and also indicate why the newly discovered or untested evidence
may prove the actual innocence of the person convicted.2 15
The court, after hearing the motion, must
set forth its findings specifically as to each of the items enumerated
[above] and either (i) dismiss the motion for failure to comply with
the requirements of [the] section or (ii) dismiss the motion for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or (iii) order that
the testing be done by the Division of Forensic Science based upon a
finding of clear and convincing16evidence that the requirements of
[section 19.2-327.1(A)] are met.

B. Writs of Actual Innocence
In the face of considerable criticism over Virginia's restrictive
"21-day rule," which limits motions for a new trial--even where
there is newly discovered evidence-to a period not later than
twenty-one days after trial,2 17 the General Assembly has created

214. Id. § 19.2-327.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
215. Id. § 19.2-327.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
216. Id. § 19.2-327.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
217. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:15(c). The Supreme Court of Virginia has previously set
out the following standard:
Motions for new trials based on after-discovered evidence are addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial judge, are not looked upon with favor, are
considered with special care and caution, and are awarded with great reluctance. The applicant bears the burden to establish that the evidence (a) appears to have been discovered subsequent to the trial; (b) could not have been
secured for use at the trial in the exercise of reasonable diligence by the
movant; (c) is not merely cumulative, corroborative or collateral; and (d) is
material, and such as should produce opposite results on the merits at another trial.
Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1983) (citations omitted);
see also Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 149, 314 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1984). In the
federal courts, habeas corpus claims of actual innocence, based solely on newly discovered
evidence and not constitutional error, are not recognized, even for those sentenced to
death. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has
stated that:
Petitioner in this case is simply not entitled to habeas relief... []or he does
not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he may bring an independent
constitutional claim challenging his conviction or sentence, but rather argues
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the writ of actual innocence.2 1 The new law, which becomes effective on November 15, 2002, allows for the petition and issuance of
a writ of actual innocence for persons convicted of a felony upon a
plea of not guilty, or for any person sentenced to death or convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, or convicted of a felony for
which the maximum penalty is life imprisonment.2 19
Convicted criminals must file the petition with the Supreme
Court of Virginia and must allege:
(i) the crime for which the petitioner was convicted and that such
conviction was upon a plea of not guilty or that the person is under a
sentence of death or convicted of (1) a Class 1 felony, (2) a Class 2
felony or (3) any felony for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life; (ii) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime
for which he was convicted; (iii) an exact description of the human
biological evidence and the scientific testing supporting the allegation of innocence; (iv) that the evidence was not previously known or
available to the petitioner or his trial attorney of record at the time
the conviction became final in the circuit court, or if known, the reason that the evidence was not subject to the scientific testing set
forth in the petition; (v) the date the test results under § 19.2-327.1
became known to the petitioner or any attorney of record; (vi) that
the petitioner or his attorney of record has filed the petition within
sixty days of obtaining the test results under § 19.2-327.1; (vii) that
the petitioner is currently incarcerated; (viii) the reason or reasons
the evidence will prove that no rational trier of fact could have found
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (ix) for any conviction
that became final in the circuit court after June 30, 1996,
that the
0
evidence was not available for testing under § 9-196.11.22

If the supreme court determines that a resolution of the case
requires further development of the facts, it may order the circuit
court to conduct a hearing to certify findings of fact on certain issues. 221 After considering the petition and the Commonwealth's
that he is entitled to habeas relief because newly discovered evidence shows
that his conviction is factually incorrect. The fundamental miscarriage ofjustice exception is available "only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence." We have never
held that it extends to freestanding claims of actual innocence. Therefore, the
exception is inapplicable here.
Id. at 404-405 (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (plurality opinion))
(citation omitted).
218. S.B. 1366, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of May 2, 2001, ch.
873, 2001 Va. Acts 1621) (codified as amended at § 19.2-327.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.2 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
220. Id. § 19.2-327.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
22L Id. § 19.2-327.4 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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response, the previous records of the case, the record of any hearing on newly tested evidence, and any findings certified from the
circuit court, the supreme court may dismiss the petition or vacate or modify the conviction.22 2

C. Driving Under the Influence
Under prior law, at a trial that involved a charge of driving under the influence, the Commonwealth was prohibited from introducing evidence in its case-in-chief that the defendant refused to
take a blood or breath test under the implied consent law.223
Prosecutors were often faced with the problem of seeking a conviction without a chemical test, which was frequently aggravated
by the presence of a jury that held the Commonwealth responsible for the absence of such much-expected evidence. In response,
the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections 18.2-268.3
and 18.2-268.10 to allow the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that the defendant unreasonably refused to allow a blood or
breath sample to be taken.22 4 The sole purpose of admitting this
evidence under the new law, however, is to explain the absence of
a chemical test at trial.22 The statute also provides that an arresting officer must advise an arrestee that a finding of an unreasonable refusal to consent may be admitted as evidence at a
criminal trial.2 26
D. Oral or Written Threats
In response to the growing awareness of threats made over the
Internet as well as those made to schoolchildren and teachers, the
General Assembly has rewritten Virginia Code section 18.2-60 to
provide that it is now a Class 6 felony to knowingly communicate
in writing a threat to kill or to do bodily injury to a person if the
threat creates a reasonable apprehension of death or bodily injury

222. Id. § 19.2-327.5 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
223. Id. § 18.2-268.10 (Repl. Vol. 1996).
224. H.B. 924, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Mar. 25, 2001,
ch. 654, 2001 Va. Acts 802) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-268.3, -268.10
(Cum. Supp. 2001)).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.10(C) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
226. Id. § 18.2-268.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
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to the recipient or his family. 227 The statute includes communications that are "electronically transmitted [to] produce a visual or
electronic message. " 28 If such communication threatens to carry
out the bodily harm on school property, including school buses,
then the crime is complete, regardless of whether the person who
is the object of the threat actually receives the threat.2 29
E. Stalking
The General Assembly provided prosecutors with a third type
of mental state that can be proved to convict a person for stalking
under Virginia Code section 18.2-60.3. Under the prior law, the
Commonwealth was required to prove that the stalker either intended or knew that his actions placed the victim in reasonable
fear of death, criminal sexual assault, or bodily injury on more
than one occasion.23 ' The new standard allows for a conviction if
the Commonwealth demonstrates that the stalker "reasonably
should1 know" that his actions place the victim in reasonable
23
fear.
F. Victim Rights in Plea Negotiations
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 19.211.01 to require the Commonwealth's Attorney, upon written request of the victim in a felony case, to inform the victim, either
verbally or in writing, of the contents of any proposed plea
agreement, and to obtain the victim's views concerning plea negotiations.23 2 While this new section does not obligate the Commonwealth's Attorney to follow the directions of the victim and does
not abrogate the Commonwealth Attorney's discretion in criminal
cases, it certainly will create a new dynamic for some prosecutors.23 3 If the prosecutor does not consult the victim concerning a

227. Id. § 18.2-60(A) (Gum. Supp. 2001).
228. Id. § 18.2-60(A)(2) (Cum.Supp. 2001).
229. Id. § 18.2-60(B) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
230. Id. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Repl. Vol. 1996).
23L Id. § 18.2-60.3(A) (Cum.Supp. 2001).
232. Id. § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d) (Cum.Supp. 2001).
233. For many other prosecutors, this section simply states what has always been a
routine practice.
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proposed plea bargain, the court may deny a plea agreement
unless the Commonwealth shows good cause for its failure to con34
sult the victim.
G. Special Grand Juries
The General Assembly has created a new mechanism for the
impaneling of special grand juries.2 35 Under the new law, a special grand jury may be impaneled upon motion of the Commonwealth's Attorney.2 3 This provision provides a powerful new tool
for prosecutors in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
activity. The special grand jury has the authority to issue subpoenas for witnesses, papers, records and documents.23 7 Procedurally, the Commonwealth's Attorney may examine witnesses
called to testify or produce evidence before the grand jury.2 38 The
special grand jury may also consider indictments and return "true
bills."2 39 Under prior law, a special grand jury could only be impaneled by a majority of the regular grand jurors or upon the
court's own motion.2 4 °

While the new special grand juries have powers similar to the
present multi-jurisdiction grand jury,2 41 the subject matter jurisdiction of the special grand jury is not limited to certain enumerated crimes.242 Moreover, the duration of a new special grand jury
is not limited in the statute.2 4 3

234. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.01(A)(4)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2001). The section confers no
procedural or substantive rights upon the defendant, and therefore cannot be used to invalidate any plea entered into by the defendant. Id.
235. S.B. 694, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2001) (enacted as Act of Feb. 13, 2001, ch.
4, 2001 Va. Acts 2) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-206 (Cum. Supp. 2001)).
236. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-206(A)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
237. Id. § 19.2-208 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
238. Id. § 19.2-210 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
239. Id. § 19.2-206(A) (Cum. Supp. 2001).
240. Id. § 19.2-206 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
241. Id. § 19.2-215.1 to -215.11 (Repl. Vol. 2000).
242. See id. §§ 19.2-206 to -215 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
243. See id.
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IX. EVIDENCE
A. Admissions
In Commonwealth v. Evans,2' the Southampton Circuit Court
held that a defendant's statements to a prosecutor during plea
negotiations could be used to impeach the defendant's alibi at
trial after plea negotiations were unsuccessful. 24 5 While federal
rules prohibit use at trial of statements made by a criminal defendant during plea negotiations,2 46 the Rules of the Supreme
Court of Virginia bar the statements only "'in the case-in-chief in
any civil or criminal proceeding against the person" who made
the statement.2 4 7
B. Unavailabilityof Witness
It is well-settled that a party who seeks to introduce the testimony of an unavailable witness may establish the witness's unavailability by demonstrating: (1) that the witness in question
will invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination; (2) that the proponent has conducted a good-faith
and diligent effort to find the witness; or (3) that the witness is
24 9 a case of first impresdeceased. 2' In Sapp v. Commonwealth,
sion, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that witnesses who
were present at trial and testified to some degree, but who stated
they were too afraid for their personal safety to fully testify at
trial, are also unavailable. 210 This unavailability rendered their
preliminary hearing testimony admissible at trial.2
The dissent in Sapp contended that the witnesses were manifestly not unavailable--they were, in fact, present at trial.2 52

244. No. CR-01-26, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 38 (Cir. Ct. May 7, 2001) (Southampton

County).
245. See id. at *8-12.
246. FED. R. EviD. 410(4).
247. Evans, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 38, at *5 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A=8(c)(5)).
248. See CHARLES E. FRIEND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA §§ 18-9 to 18-11 (5th
ed. 1999).
249. 35 Va. App. 519, 546 S.E.2d 245 (Ct. App. 2001).
250. Id. at 526, 546 S.E.2d at 249.
25L Id. at 529, 546 S.E.2d at 250.
252. Id. at 530, 546 S.E.2d at 250-51 (Benton, J., dissenting).
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Though the majority held that it lay in the discretion of the trial
judge to use the contempt power to compel the witnesses' testimony, 53 the dissent reasoned that by admitting the preliminary
hearing testimony, the accused's right to confront his accusers
was unfairly curtailed. 4 Moreover, the fearful witnesses in Sapp
did not actually contend that the defendant had threatened them,
or that anyone on his behalf had done so.255 They testified only to
a "general fear because of 'hearing talk here and there in the
streets."'25 6
In response to the suggestion that the use of preliminary hearing testimony operated in derogation of the defendant's Confrontation Clause right, the majority noted that the defendant had
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the preliminary hearing.257 This observation ignores the fact that a preliminary hearing may, in many cases, precede by many months the
actual trial of a case; thus, at a preliminary hearing, a crossexaminer may not have completed investigation of the facts of the
case or fully know in what way to cross-examine a witness. Counsel confronted with the attempted admission of a stale transcript
should note that, for these reasons, old testimony should not be
admitted.
2 5 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
In Cairns v. Commonwealth,
decided the question of whether a co-defendant's hearsay admissions may be admitted against an accused pursuant to Virginia's
"statement-against-interest" hearsay exception.2 59 The court concluded that admission of such statements violates the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantee unless the statements contain "'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness
such that the adversarial testing of the statement would be expected to add little, if anything, to the statement's reliability.'"2 6
Those guarantees do not include the fact that the statement was
voluntary or that other evidence in the case tends to corroborate

253. Id. at 528, 546 S.E.2d at 250.
254. Id. at 531, 546 S.E.2d at 251 (Benton, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 532, 546 S.E.2d at 252 (Benton, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 528-29, 546 S.E.2d at 250.
258. 35 Va.App. 1, 542 S.E.2d 771 (Ct. App. 2001).
259. See id. at 9-10, 542 S.E.2d at 776.
260. Id. at 13, 542 S.E.2d at 777 (quoting Dearing v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 117, 123,
524 S.E.2d 121, 124 (2000)).
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the statement.2 6 ' Rather, the court must examine whether adversarial examination of the co-defendant's motive to lie, or any
other attempt to mitigate the co-defendant's role in the offense,
would be at the expense of the defendant.6 2 If the content of the
statement or the circumstances surrounding the statement give
rise to an inference of such motive or impulse by the nontestifying co-defendant, then the defendant's Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Clause right to confront his accuser is abrogated by
introducing the hearsay testimony.26 This special concern for the
admissibility of co-defendant hearsay is born of the fact that such
testimony is "'inherently unreliable.' 2
C. Impeachment by Felony Conviction
A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia makes clear
that although for some purposes a person has not been "convicted" of an offense until she has been both adjudicated guilty
and sentenced, for purposes of using a felony conviction to impeach a witness's credibility, the accused is convicted upon her
guilty plea, even if her sentence has not yet been imposed.26 " A
guilty plea is, after all, "'a self-supplied conviction authorizing
imposition of the punishment fixed by law."'2 6 If, however, the
witness pled not guilty to the offense, and is awaiting sentencing
at the time of her testimony, the mere fact that guilt had been determined would be an insufficient basis for impeaching the witness's testimony.6 7
D. Evidentiary Concerns in Sex Offense Cases
The Court of Appeals of Virginia recently held that a sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) may be qualified as an expert in
"the diagnosis of sexual assault" and may testify that certain observed conditions or injuries are consistent or inconsistent with
261. Id. at 13-14, 542 S.E.2d at 777.
262. See id.
263. See id. at 14-15, 542 S.E.2d at 777-78.
264. Id. at 13, 542 S.E.2d at 777 (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541, 545 (1986)).
265. Jewel v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 430, 433, 536 S.E.2d 905, 906 (2000).
266. Id. at 422, 536 S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196, 169 S.E.2d
569, 571 (1969)).
267. See id.
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consensual, first-time sexual intercourse.2 68 In rendering an expert opinion that certain injuries are inconsistent with consensual sex, the SANE nurse does not run afoul of the proscription
against testifying as to the ultimate issue in a criminal case.269
In prosecutions for many sex offenses, Virginia's Rape Shield
statute27 ° provides for pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of
evidence related to the victim's sexual history and reputation.'
These hearings are intended to allow the trial judge to pass on
the admissibility of particular evidence. 2 However, the hearings
are not intended as discovery devices during which a defendant
may discover evidence of the complainant's sexual history that
may later become the subject of an evidentiary dispute. 3
X. SENTENCING

In Brooks v. Commonwealth,2 7 4 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
interpreted the prior Supreme Court of Virginia decision in
Fishback v. Commonwealth."5 The court of appeals held that, although the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury in accordance with Fishback, the error was harmless, and the appellant was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 6 The court
began by noting that a non-constitutional error by the trial court
is harmless if "'it plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the trial that the error did not affect the ver-

268. Velazquez v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 189, 197-99, 543 S.E.2d 631, 635-36
(Ct. App. 2001).
269. See id. at 199-200, 543 S.E.2d 636-37. This case also illustrates the willingness of
the court of appeals to broadly defer to the factual determinations made in the trial court.
See, e.g., id. at 194, 543 S.E.2d at 633. The court affirmed the conviction for rape, which
required proof of penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ, on the prosecutrix's testimony that she felt vaginal pain, that the defendant's waist was at her knees,
that he was making an up and down motion, and that the defendant's hands were visible
at her sides. Id. at 193-94, 543 S.E.2d at 633-34.
270. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.7 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
271. Id.
272. Blackmon v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 728, 734, 536 S.E.2d 918, 921 (Ct. App.
2000).
273. See id.
274. No. 0366-00-2, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
275. 260 Va. 104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000). In Fishback, the supreme court held that "juries shall be instructed, as a matter of law, on the abolition of parole for non-capital felony
offenses committed on or after January 1, 1995." Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634.
276. Brooks, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 268, at *2.
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dict."277 In Brooks, the jury returned verdicts of the minimum
2 78

sentence provided by statute for each of the appellant's charges.
Thus, the court concluded that "without usurping the jury's factfinding function ...had the jury been properly instructed on the

abolition of parole in Virginia, the penalty verdict would have
been the same. Accordingly, the error was harmless and... the
appellant's sentence" was affirmed. 9
In Pughsley v. Commonwealth,8 ° the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that evidence of bad character as a juvenile is admissible in the sentencing phase to rebut the defendant's evidence of
good character.28 ' In Pughsley, the appellant contended that the
trial court erred by permitting the Commonwealth to introduce
rebuttal evidence, consisting of unadjudicated criminal behavior,
specific bad acts, and institutional infractions committed in juvenile detention, during the sentencing phase of the trial.28 2 The
appellant claimed that the Commonwealth's rebuttal evidence
should have been restricted to rebutting the specific character
evidence to which his witnesses testified and further limited to
the time period about which his witnesses testified.283
In its analysis, the court stated:
Code § 19.2-295.1, the provision governing the bifircated sentencing
proceeding, goes beyond the common law rule of evidence, which disallows proof of a defendant's specific bad acts to rebut the defendant's character evidence. The Supreme Court [of Virginia] has
made clear that Code § 19.2-295.1, which allows a defendant to introduce relevant evidence of his "history and background" in a sentencing procedure, also allows the Commonwealth to introduce rebuttal evidence once the defendant
has undertaken to put his history
2 84
and background in issue.

Utilizing this reasoning, the court held that when a defendant
puts on evidence of his good character, specifically his history and
277. Id. at *3(quoting Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d
910, 911 (Ct. App. 1991) (en banc) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-678 (Repl. Vol. 2000 &
Cum. Supp. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
278. Id.
279. Id. at :5-6.
280. 33 Va. App. 640, 536 S.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 2000).
281. Id. at 647, 536 S.E.2d at 450.
282. See id. at 644-45, 536 S.E.2d at 449.
283. Id. at 642, 536 S.E.2d at 448.
284. Id. at 646, 536 S.E.2d at 450 (citing Commonwealth v. Shifflett, 257 Va. 34, 43-44,
510 S.E.2d 232, 236 (1999)).
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background of good behavior, the Commonwealth may introduce
specific acts in the defendant's history and background that prove
that the defendant has a history and background of criminal or
bad acts, or that the defendant is not of good character.28 5
286
Despite the ruling in Pughsley, in Duong v. Commonwealth,
the Court of Appeals of Virginia took steps toward preventing the
use of juvenile records in certain situations.2 87 In Duong, the
appellant was convicted of two counts of grand larceny pursuant
to a plea agreement.
Upon the appellant's request, the trial
court ordered a presentence report.2 89 Prior to sentencing, the
appellant moved to preclude consideration of his juvenile
adjudications, claiming that the required notice was not given to
his father and, therefore, under the rule enunciated in Baker v.
Commonwealth,2 9 the proceedings were void. 29 After the court of
appeals found that the juvenile court did not give notice of the
proceedings to the appellant's father, making the prior juvenile
adjudications void, the Commonwealth noted that the appellant
did not seek, in this proceeding, to have his juvenile court
adjudications
voided
and
thus
extinguished. 292
The
Commonwealth, therefore, argued that the appellant could not
"refrain from having those adjudications ruled void while at the
same time arguing that they are void for the purposes of
subsequent sentencing."293 The court did not accept this argument
and, finding in favor of the appellant, stated that "the failure to
have those adjudications officially voided does not alter the fact
294
that they are void and cannot be used."
In Ruffin v. Commonwealth,2 95 the appellant prevailed when
the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that a court does not have

285. Id. at 647, 536 S.E.2d at 450.
286. 34 Va. App. 424, 542 S.E.2d 47 (Ct. App. 2001).
287. See id. at 428, 542 S.E.2d at 49.
288. Id. at 427, 542 S.E.2d at 48.
289. Id.
290. 28 Va. App. 306, 315, 504 S.E.2d 394, 399 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that where a
juvenile court conducts a delinquency proceeding without notifying the parents or certifying that notice cannot reasonably be obtained, the resulting convication order is void),
affd per curiam, 258 Va. 1, 516 S.E.2d 219 (1999).
291. Duong, 34 Va. App. at 427, 542 S.E.2d at 49.
292. Id. at 428, 542 S.E.2d at 49.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 429, 542 S.E.2d at 49.
295. 35 Va. App. 79, 542 S.E.2d 808 (Ct. App. 2001).
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the power to enforce a jail sentence in a defendant's absence.296
The appellant, Daymon Ruffin, was convicted, in his absence, of
driving on a suspended driver's license and subsequently sentenced to twelve months in jail.297 On appeal, the appellant contended that Virginia Code section 19.2-258 does not provide trial
courts with the authority to enforce a jail sentence upon defendants who have been released on recognizance bonds, or admitted
to bail, but have failed to appear for trial. 298 The court agreed,
holding that if a defendant charged with a misdemeanor fails to
appear for trial,
the trial court may elect to (1) issue a capias for failure to appear
and continue further proceedings or (2) proceed to trial in the defendant's absence and if convicted, sentence the defendant, but in that
event and pursuant to Code section 19.2-237,
such sentence may not
299
include an unsuspended jail sentence.

In Johnson v. Commonwealth,"' the Court of Appeals of Virginia also addressed the question of whether a trial court lacks
jurisdiction to revoke suspended sentences when predicate violations occur after a defendant's term of probation has ended.'O° The
court held that trial courts do have jurisdiction in such cases under Virginia Code section 19.2-306.o2 The court of appeals reasoned that because the petitioner could have received a maximum
sentence of ten years for her conviction, the trial court retained
the authority to revoke her suspended sentence up to ten years
from the
date of her conviction, regardless of her probationary
3 03
status.
XI. APPEALS
In Michaels v. Commonwealth, ° ' the Virginia Court of Appeals
re-affirmed that even in the absence of any objection in the trial
court, the appellate court will consider appeals where there has
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

See id. at 85, 542 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 80, 542 S.E.2d at 808.
See id. at 82, 542 S.E.2d at 809.
Id. at 85, 542 S.E.2d at 810.
No. 0072-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 5 (Va. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at*l.
See id. at *4-5.
Id.
32 Va. App. 601, 529 S.E.2d 822 (Ct. App. 2000).
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been a miscarriage of justice. °5 In these cases, appellants must
demonstrate more than just that the Commonwealth failed to
prove an element of an offense, and, consequently, that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred. 30 6 Rather, appellants must
also show that they were convicted for conduct that was not an offense or that an element of the charged offense did not occur, and
that as 7a result of this error, a miscarriage of justice did actually
30

occur.

In Smith v. Commonwealth,0 8 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
also affirmed its intention to strictly adhere to the jurisdictional
requirements imposed by the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.0 9 In this case, the court of appeals disallowed an appeal
because the appellant failed to file indispensable transcripts
within sixty days of final judgment. 10 Although the appellant
failed to make the appropriate filing because he did not realize
the trial court had entered final judgment in the case since the
court entered an order that was not circulated to counsel,3 1 ' the
court of appeals ruled that "'counsel of record have the duty and
responsibility to examine the public record and to determine the
date of entry of such orders."'31 2
XII. CONCLUSION

Few areas of the law implicate citizens' liberty and property interests in as tangible and direct a way as the criminal law. It
should come as no surprise, then, that the forces that push
change in the criminal law come to do battle with closely held
ideological views. It is reasonable to expect that extraordinary
evolution in legal doctrine and theory might spring from that
clash of ideas. Such was certainly the case this past year. It most
certainly will be next year.

305.
306.
272-73
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

See id. at 608, 529 S.E.2d at 826.
Id. (citing Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221-22, 487 S.E.2d 269,
(Ct. App. 1987)).
Id. (citing Redman, 25 Va. App. at 221-22, 487 S.E.2d at 273-73).
32 Va. App. 766, 531 S.E.2d 11 (Ct. App. 2000).
See id. at 771, 531 S.E.2d at 14.
Id. at 769, 531 S.E.2d at 13.
Id. at 773, 531 S.E.2d at 15.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Stanaway, 242 Va. 286, 289, 410 S.E.2d 610, 612 (1991)).

